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Abstract. The board of directors performs a very important role in formulating and 
monitoring the strategy of a company. Recent development in technology and the change in 
business environment as well as change in the nature of demand by customers has 
necessitated the change in the products and services offered by finance companies. Based 
on data from finance companies listed on Bursa Malaysia over the period 2007 to 2011 this 
paper examined the impact of board attributes and ownership structure on the corporate 
strategy of finance companies in Malaysia. The result indicates that expertise of directors 
and past performance is significant and negatively related with diversification. The study 
contributes to the literature on corporate governance of finance companies in relation to 
their diversification strategy and has highlighted the corporate governance mechanisms and 
regulatory measures appropriate for the sector in order to enhance monitoring so as to 
achieve sustainable economic development. 
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1. Introduction 
ecent development in technology and the change in business environment 
as well as change in the nature of demand by customers has necessitated 
the change in focus of finance companies and change in products and 
services offered by those companies (Westman, 2009). This change led to financial 
innovation which has increased risks in businesses and therefore requires more 
monitoring of the finance companies by directors with necessary attributes to 
monitor the companies. The global financial crisis, Asian financial crisis and the 
corporate failures have highlighted the importance of governance mechanisms and 
necessitated the need for closer monitoring of financial institutions and reforms in 
corporate governance by regulatory authorities (Becht, Bolton & Roel, 2012). The 
reforms resulted in enactment of several codes and principles such as the Sarbanes 
Oxley’s Act of 2002 in the United States. In the United Kingdom, several 
committees such as Hampel committee, Greenbury, Cadbury were formed to look 
at different aspects of corporate governance such as issue of directors’ 
remuneration, board subcommittees and the financial aspect of corporate 
governance (Leuz & Wysock, 2008). One of the requirements common in most of 
those corporate governance movements is the need for strengthening the role of the 
board. One of the issues that led to corporate scandals, financial crisis in Asia and 
the recent global financial crisis was the weaknesses in the corporate governance 
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mechanisms and the change in focus by the companies (Erkens, Huang & Matos, 
2009; Barney, 2009; Mohamad & Sulong, 2010).  
The finance sector was not left out of the effects of the dynamism of business 
environment that resulted into the development of new products and services by the 
finance companies (Walter & Saunders, 2011). These inventions made regulators 
everywhere in the world to devise measures that will assist them to assess the 
changes and come out with rules to cope with the rapid growth and changes in 
products that were made available to customers through the non-traditional banks 
(Jones 2000; Gopinath, 2008). International waves of crisis have also affected the 
finance industry of different countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and some other Asian countries (Bazdresh & 
Werner, 2000). These crises motivated some of the firms to diversify their 
activities in order to diversify their source of revenue and to prevent the adverse 
effects of a decline in one segment or sector of the economy from affecting the 
overall firm performance. In regulated industries, the activities of firms are highly 
regulated and influenced by the regulators. These limit the strategic options 
available to such firms and sometimes take away the responsibility of selecting the 
appropriate strategic direction for the firms from the board of directors to the 
regulators since the regulators have to approve major strategic choices made by the 
firms(Lang & Lockhart, 1990). This could reduce the level of involvement of 
directors and management in finding or selecting the appropriate strategies and 
responding quickly to changes in the industries which arise due to technological 
advancement and changes in the environment. On the other hand, in less regulated 
industries there is high competition, sudden changes in the market and threat from 
new entrants which make firms to continuously struggle to stay ahead of 
competition. Therefore, directors and management in those firms have to be 
actively involved in advising on the strategic choices which will enhance firm 
performance and give it competitive advantage. As a result of competition and 
changes in business environment, firms need to have directors who will act as 
providers of resources which are not available internally to the firms (Hillman, 
2005). In order words board need to appoint directors that will help improve the 
companies’ position and competitive advantage. 
The existence of a sound financial system is needed for the attainment of the 
status of a developed economy. Such sound financial system mobilizes and 
allocates funds to various sectors of the economy that helps to lower the cost of 
capital to the firms, boost capital formation and stimulate productive activities and 
growth in the economy (Becht et al. 2012). The position of finance companies in an 
economy is central to the accomplishment of the economic goals of the country 
(Sufian & Habibullah, 2013). Therefore, poor governance in finance companies 
could come with great loss to the entire economy in the form of huge expenditure 
to rescue finance companies and failure to accomplish economic goals that are 
accomplishable only through the financial system (Thillainathan, 1999). Finance 
companies are the main depository of the economy and this makes their 
performance through enhanced governance practices a very vital issue to the 
economy and different from other sectors of the economy (Becht et al. 2012). The 
recognition of these and the recurring problems such as the banking crisis of 1980s, 
the Asian financial crisis and the recent financial crisis in the sector made 
regulators to continuously update the regulatory requirement concerning corporate 
mechanisms such as board of directors. Performance of finance companies is of 
great importance to the Malaysian government. Apart from investments in the 
sector, the sector is used by the government for the implementation of economic 
programmes such as National economic policy, 1971(NEP)/National development 
policy 1991 (NDP) byprovidingfunds and extending loans through the sector to the 
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intended economic sector (Kim & Rasiah, 2010). Furthermore, the contributions of 
the finance sector to the Malaysian economy is substantial which is second after 
manufacturing sector in terms of gross domestic product (Economic Planning Unit, 
2011).  
Several contributions have been made on the board-strategy field, however, 
there is no clear answer on how board attributes contributes to strategy and 
therefore there is the need to develop a better understanding of how board 
attributes contributes to strategy by looking at how board attributes influence the 
relationship between board of directors and strategy (Pugliese et al., 2009). 
Although prior studies have examined the impact of corporate strategy on firm 
performance, less attention has been given to the factors that determine the 
adoption of a particular strategy by a finance company. Thus, this study examines 
the impact of board attributes and ownership structure on diversification strategy of 
finance companies in Malaysia. The result of the study indicates that attributes of 
board of directors’ influence the strategy of finance companies. The study will 
enable management to ensure that companies have board with attributes that are in 
line with their corporate strategy. The rest of the paper is organized as follows; 
section two contains a review of literature while section three presents hypothesis 
development. Section four explains the research methodology; the presentation and 
discussion of the result was done in section five while section six and seven 
contains results from additional analyses and conclusion of the study respectively.  
 
2. Literature Review  
Strong competition among finance companies and the need to reduce the 
volatility of the revenue of finance companies has resulted in the diversification of 
finance companies into other segments of the finance industry. This leads to an 
increase in revenue of the companies due to additional sources and stability of the 
revenue of the companies since the income from non-traditional sources (fee based 
services) is not subject to the business conditions which affect the traditional 
sources of revenues (Stiroh, 2004). Stiroh (2004) examined the impact of 
diversification among US banks and the results indicate reduction in volatility of 
net interest income and that diversification is associated with high risk and low 
profit implying that financial institutions derive low benefit from diversification. 
Stiroh (2006) examined the determinants of risk in US bank holding companies 
based on the period of observation from 1997 to 2004 and reported that diversified 
activities in the banks are highly volatile, creates difference in the risk level among 
the financial institutions and leads to complexity in the operations of the firms. 
Rose (1989) examined the impact of diversification on risk in banks and found that 
diversification of banking activities into other activities particularly insurance helps 
reduce risk in banks. 
Using a sample of 370 finance firms and 1000 mergers in the period from 1971 
to 1987, Boyd, Graham & Hewitt (1993) examined the effect of merger between 
banking and non-banking holding firms, the result depicts that the merger of 
banking firms with insurance firms may reduce risk while merger of bank holding 
firms with securities firms and real estate firms may increase risk. In addition, 
Strioh & Rumble (2006) examined whether diversification has led to improved 
performance of US financial holding companies based on the period from 1997 to 
2002.  They found that firms drive benefits from diversification but the benefit is 
removed by the extra risk to which the firms are exposed due to the volatility of the 
non-traditional activities which may not be more profitable than the traditional 
activities. DeYoung & Roland (2001) examined the impact of product mix on 
earnings volatility of 472 US banks based on the period 1988 to 1995 and reported 
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that based on the result of OLS regression, although diversifying from the 
traditional business of the finance company was aimed at increasing and ensuring 
stability of the revenue, high reliance on non-interest income will reduce the 
benefit derivable from the change in focus as a result of higher risk for the 
companies and increase in volatility of the revenue.  
In addition, Acharya, Saunders & Hasan (2002) examined the impact of 
diversification and focus on the performance and risk of 105 banks in Italy based 
on data for the period from 1993 to 1999 and concluded that diversifying assets of 
a finance firm will neither enhance performance nor reduce risk because a firm 
may diversify into areas it has less competitive advantage and that the impact of 
diversification depends on whether it is industrial, sectoral or geographic 
diversification. Furthermore, Stiroh & Rumble (2006) argued that the cost 
associated with increased risk of diversified activities will outweigh the benefits of 
such diversification. Park & Jang (2013) examined the impact of both related and 
within industry diversification on performance on a panel data of 288 firms in the 
US restaurant industry over the period 1980 to 2008. The results based on GMM 
found that within industry diversification is significant and negatively related with 
profitability in the short run but positive and significant in the long run. They also 
found that diversification may enhance firm performance only at high levels of 
diversification because of the negative effect of diversification when it is at low 
level. In addition, at low level of related diversification, the related business risk is 
higher than the expected risk reduction that could result from diversifying the 
businesses. 
Other prior studies have shown that diversifying activities of finance companies 
into non-traditional activities is beneficial because of the increase in revenue (Rose, 
1989), reduction in risk due to diversified portfolio (Saunders & Walter, 1994) and 
reduced possibility of bankruptcy (Boyd & Graham, 1988; Boyd, Graham & 
Hewitt, 1993). Chen & Yu (2012) examined the relationship between managerial 
ownership, diversification and firm performance from a sample of 98 firms listed 
on Taiwanese stock exchange from 1996 to 2001. The regression results revealed a 
positive relationship between diversification and short term firm performance but 
no impact on performance in mid-term and added that firms using unrelated 
diversification strategy perform better than those pursing related diversification 
strategies. From agency theory perspective, diversification may create further 
agency problem between the management and the shareholders when managers 
diversify in order to get personal benefit at the expense of the shareholders 
(Ataullah, Davidson, Le & Wood, 2012). Conversely, based on a study of the 
impact of diversification on the value of a sample of firms, Graham, Lemmon 
&Wolf (2002) reported that diversification does not create agency problem and it 
does not destroy value. This argument has been proven by Ataullah et al. (2012) 
who reported that the level of purchase of firms shares by insiders increase with the 
extent of corporate diversification which shows that insiders do not pursue 
diversification with the aim of value destruction. 
Other empirical evidence has shown that profitability of focus banks is higher 
than diversified banks (Laeven & Levine, 2007) while Stiroh, (2004) and Stiroh & 
Rumble (2006) found that diversified banks are more profitable than non-
diversified banks. Mercieca, Schaeck & Wolf (2007) also found similar result in a 
sample of small European banks. Furthermore, Stiroh & Rumble (2006) found that 
the cost associated with increased risk of diversified activities outweighs the 
benefits of such diversification. In addition, they argued that diversification alone 
will not enhance performance but other factors such as managerial skills, scale, 
location or industry factors may influence performance.  
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Directors provide a firm with knowledge, information and link to resources. 
From resources dependence theory perspective, directors provide a firm with 
resources which are not otherwise available (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The 
strategy of a firm is initiated and implemented by the management while the board 
of directors approves and monitor the strategic choices (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Based on resource dependence theory, directors contribute to strategic decision 
making by providing access to resources which the firm needs (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). On the other hand, involvement of board in strategy may destroy value 
(Fulghieri & Hodrick, 2006). The role board of directors plays in a firm and how it 
perform the functions stipulated by the regulators is influenced by the firm and 
industry characteristics (Pugliese, Minichilli & Zattoni, 2014). Therefore, boards of 
firms in highly regulated industries such as finance industry provide more 
monitoring and advice to management compared to boards in firms operating in 
less regulated industries. From resource dependence theory perspective, board of 
directors are assets of the firm which contribute to value creation by providing 
access to resources which the firm may not have access to (Hillman, Withers & 
Collins, 2009). Board of directors provide very important role in firms which from 
agency theory perspective includes monitoring managers and firm performance and 
from resources dependence theory includes providing advice and access to 
resources (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The advice provided by the board could be 
advice on strategy, participation in decision-making and supervising the 
implementation of the strategic choices (Pugliese et al., 2014).  
According to Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) board of directors provide the firm with 
‘advice and counsel, access to information, preferential access to resources and 
legitimacy. The board of directors performs a very important role in formulating 
the strategy of a company. Board of directors by definition refers to the internal 
governing mechanism that shapes the firm’s governance through advice and 
monitoring of management (Aguilera, Desender & De Castro, 2011). Zahra & 
Pearce (1989) viewed the role of directors as falling into three main roles which 
includes: service, strategy and control. Looking at it from the agency theory 
perspective, the presence of board of directors will enhance company performance 
by reducing agency cost (Al Mamun, Yasser & Rahman, 2013) that could result 
from diversification of a business. The ability of the board to discharge its role 
effectively may be hampered if the board is not structured properly, if there is 
domination of the board by CEO or there is problem with composition. The board 
of directors is an important monitoring mechanism in monitoring activities of 
managers (Zahra & Pearce 1989) especially in finance firms due to the complexity 
in the operations of those firms.  
The management designs measures to manage risks and ensure proper 
implementation of those measures especially in diversified firms due to the 
increased risk in such firms (Andres & Vallelado, 2008). The outside directors on 
the other hand will provide monitoring over the activities of management and those 
measures put to safeguard the firm against risk (Ezzamel & Watson, 2005). Unlike 
non-finance companies, high risk taking by management in finance companies 
could lead to several failures (Tao & Hutchinson, 2013) and the cost of failure 
could be great to the entire economy (Pathon, 2009). The failure of an important or 
dominant company in the finance sector will lead to a ‘contraction’ in the finance 
sector ultimately leading to the failure of other companies in the sector similar to 
what happened during the financial crisis (Gordon, 2010; Gordon & Muller, 2010).  
 
3. Hypotheses Development  
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Board composition may be influenced by the strategy a firm adapts since the 
change in the environment of a firm may increase the competition and therefore the 
need to devise other ways to remain competitive. Therefore, board composition 
may need to be changed to reflect the change in the strategy of the firm by 
including directors from different background who will link the firm with the 
resources it needs to remain competitive (Hillman, et al., 2000). Furthermore, the 
composition of board of directors of a firm from resources dependence theory 
perspective is determined by the changes in the external environment. Therefore, 
the more dynamic the business environment in which a firm operates is, the higher 
the number of directors that needs to be appointed to the board and the more 
diverse the board of directors (Hillmam, et al., 2000).  
In addition, outside directors may be more important and needed by firms in 
regulated industry such as finance industry especially directors with appropriate 
experience. According to Pfeffer (1972) the composition of the board of directors 
of a firm is influenced by the extent to which a firm is dependent on the external 
environment for certain resources implying that firms that are highly dependent on 
the external environment for certain resources may need more outside directors that 
could serve as a link between the firm and the resources. He added that board 
composition is influenced by the response of organization to external 
environmental conditions. Independent directors serve as an important mechanism 
for the reduction of agency problem and the protection of minority shareholders 
(Ghazali, 2010). In diversified financial institutions with complex operations and 
sophisticated products (Stiroh, 2004), the presence of independent directors on the 
board helps to ensure the monitoring of management.  
The importance of board chair independence depends on the strategic focus of 
company. Small companies that operate in one segment of the finance industry 
may benefit more from board with non-independent chair that will concentrate 
more on providing the necessary advice on the ways to enhance the performance 
and market potentials of the company while the effective monitoring service of 
independent chair will be more valuable to a finance company with complex assets 
and operations (Carcello, Hermason & Ye, 2011). Furthermore, the strategy of a 
finance company determines the extent of agency problem, risk, profitability and 
the ability of stakeholders to monitor its activities. Thus, performance of 
diversified financial institutions could be affected if the board is dominated by 
independent directors who may not have technical expertise to monitor the 
products and services of diversified finance companies such as investment banking 
services and trading in capital market which are fee based and very volatile (Stiroh, 
2006). Minton, Taillard & Williamson (2011) found that independence of board 
reduces risk taking activities of insiders leading to a decrease in losses especially 
during financial crisis. Therefore, we posit that independent directors will likely 
support traditional strategy instead of diversified strategy that may increase the risk 
in firms and likely affect performance. The following relationship was 
hypothesized; 
H1 There is a positive relationship between board composition and 
diversification strategy of a finance company.     
H2 There is a positive relationship between independent board chair and 
diversification strategy of a finance company. 
From resources dependent theory perspective a firm could enhance its 
competitive advantage by appointing directors with superior knowledge of the 
industry and regulation governing the industry so that they will be able to advise 
managers to take decision that will give the firm competitive advantage (Hillman, 
2005). According to (Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000) having expert directors 
on the board reduces uncertainty and transaction cost associated with regulatory 
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agencies. Directors with executive experience bring expertise and experience to the 
board as a result of their experience about internal firm operations and decision 
making in other firms (Hillman et al., 2000). In addition, their experience will 
enable them to bring a different view point on issues and provide information about 
how other firms dealt with certain problems. The external directors may provide 
advice and serve as a means of evaluating management proposals as strategies are 
being formulated (Hillman et al., 2000). 
The effectiveness of board members in discharging their functions depends on 
their level of expertise in accounting and finance (Raber, 2003). Directors with 
accounting expertise and finance industry related experience would be in a better 
position to monitor the financial accounting and reporting activities in complex 
organizations like finance company (Tao & Hutchinson, 2013). Although expertize 
enhances the effectiveness of directors, the effect may vary with the company’s 
strategy and lifecycle stage. In addition, industry expertize of directors may be 
more beneficial to a small and non-diversified small company in its early stage of 
development since the directors could serve as a resource to the management, 
while an established and diversified company at the declining stage of its 
development and with dispersed shareholdings may benefit more from directors 
with accounting and finance expertize who will concentrate on monitoring the 
company (Carcello et al. 2011).  
Minton et al. (2011) found that banks with more expert independent directors 
had poor performance compared to those with less expert directors. This could be 
explained by familiarity and understanding of the expert independent directors 
about sophisticated financial instruments which made them to allow management 
to take excessive risks. This could imply that firms with more expert directors took 
more risk by diversifying into risky businesses. Therefore, the following 
relationship was hypothesized;    
H3 There is a positive relationship between board expertize and diversification 
strategy of finance companies. 
H4 There is a positive relationship between board composed of directors with 
executive experience and diversification strategy of finance companies.  
Ownership structure determines the extent of monitoring of the company’s 
affairs because concentrated ownership which is common in developing countries 
could enhance performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Mokhtar et al., 2009) and 
help reduce agency problem by aligning the interest of the shareholders, 
management and other stakeholders such as directors, institutional shareholders 
and government through ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Studies have 
shown that concentrated ownership which is a common form of ownership in 
developing countries is associated with better accounting performance in 
Malaysian companies (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Mokhtar et al., 2009). The agency 
problem is expected to be minimal when the interest of the directors and the other 
shareholders is aligned through ownership of stake in the company by the directors. 
This will ensure that the strategy taken by management will promote the interest of 
all the shareholders and is in line with the acceptable risk level for all stakeholders. 
The risk appetite and the need for more profit by the controlling shareholders may 
influence firm’s strategy. Therefore, the following relationship was hypothesized;  
H5 There is a positive relationship between director ownership and 
diversification strategy of finance companies. 
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4. Research Methodology 
The sample comprised all finance companies listed on the finance sector of the 
main market of Bursa Malaysia as at the end of year 2011, which consist of 
companies spread across the various segments of the finance sector. 
The study used secondary data that was collected from the annual report of the 
companies available from the website of Bursa Malaysia or the company’s website. 
In addition to the annual reports, financial information about the companies was 
obtained from Bloomberg data source. The annual report was used to obtain 
information on corporate governance mechanisms while information on the 
dependent variable and the control variables was obtained from financial 
information available from Bloomberg database. 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables and analyze the data. 
The study tests the following research model: 
 
DIV=α + β1 CCit +β2 CINEDit+β3 FEit+β4 EEit+β5 OWNit +β6 SIZEit +β7 
LEVit + β8 ROAit +YD + εit 
 
The variables of the model are proxied as follows: 
 
DIV = The ratio of non-interest income to total operating income 
CC =  Proportion of independent directors to total directors on the board 
CINED=  Dummy variable of one if chair is independent director zero otherwise 
FE =  Proportion of directors with accounting qualification on the board   
EE =  Proportion of directors with executive experience 
OWN =  Proportion of share ownership by directors 
SIZE =  Log of total assets 
LEV= Total debt divided by equity 
ROA= Return on assets 
 
Furthermore, in order to reduce the possibility of endogeneity from omitted 
variable bias, we included a number of variables that could influence the adaption 
of diversification strategy by a firm (Chenhall & Moers, 2007).  Control variables 
such as firm size, leverage and previous firm performance were used as control 
variable since evidence has shown that past performance affect the extent of board 
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monitoring and advice to the management (Pugliese et al., 2014). Although there 
are roles prescribed by the regulatory requirements for the board of directors, the 
roles board gives more attention to depends on the circumstances of the company. 
Past performance of a firm affects the level of directors’ involvement in providing 
advice to the firm. Directors are less involved in advising management on the 
appropriate strategic choice to make when a firm is performing very well while in 
poorly performing firms directors actively engage in monitoring and advise 
functions (Pugliese et al., 2014). In other words, board do not pay attention to their 
work when firm performance is good which could make the CEO to have more 
powers over the board and could make the board less active in performing its 
monitoring functions. From another perspective, past performance may imply less 
attention on financial control and monitoring activities and more attention on 
strategy by the board since high performance may mean the firm needs to find new 
investment opportunities in order to expand and become more productive (Hillman, 
2005).In order words in profitable firms, board place more emphasis on new 
strategic direction and opportunities thereby reducing monitoring function (Lynall, 
Golden & Hillman, 2003). 
Size was identified as a control variable and proxied as log of total assets in the 
research model similar to other prior studies (Pathan, 2009; Praptiningsih, 2009; 
Tao & Hutchinson, 2013) to account for the impact of resources on the 
diversification of a company. The size of a finance company will influence its 
ability to diversify its sources of revenue and at the same time prevent a significant 
change in its revenue in case of poor performance of particular business segment 
(Sufian 2010). On the other hand, the diversification of finance company will 
increase its risks as well as losses. In addition to size, leverage was also used as a 
control variable and was proxied by total debt divided by equity. 
 
5. Reseults and Discussions 
5.1. Results of descriptive statistics 
The results of descriptive statistics presented in Table one indicates that the 
variables are normally distributed as depicted by the skewness and kurtosis values 
which are between ±3.00 and ±10.00 respectively. In addition to the test of 
normality for individual variables, normality for the group indicates that the data is 
normally distributed. 
 
Table 1.Results of descriptive statistics 
 DIV CC CINED FE EE OWN  FS LEV ROA 
Mean 0.339  0.481  0.260  0.312  0.353  0.030 0.042 0.064 0.025 
Median 0.000  0.500  0.000  0.300  0.333  0.001 0.036 0.037 0.015 
Maximum 1.000  0.777  1.000  0.857  0.800  0.240 0.088 0.310 0.079 
Minimum 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.00  0.00  0.000 0.025 0.025 0.002 
Std. Dev. 0.474  0.111  0.440  0.166  0.214  0.059 0.012 0.062 0.019 
Skewness 0.678 -0.458  1.090  0.393  0.140  2.106 0.738 1.420 1.253 
Kurtosis 1.460  4.451  2.190  3.273  2.129  6.144 2.704 5.204 3.265 
Obs. 165  142 142 185 185  142  165 165 185 
Notes: div=diversification, CC=independent directors, CINED=independent board chair, FE=finance 
expertise, EE=executive experience, OWN=direct director ownership, FS=firm size, LEV=leverage, 
ROA=return on assets. 
 
Heteroskedasticity problem was identified and dealt with using the white’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error while autocorrelation was addressed 
using white diagonal method. The result of correlation analysis presented in Table 
two indicates no multicollinearity problem in the model since none of the bivariate 
correlation is greater than 0.7. 
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Table 2.Results of correlation analysis 
 ROA DIV CC CINED FE EE OWN FS LEV 
DIV  1.000  1.000  0.009 -0.126 -0.155  0.021  0.198 -0.478 -0.135 
CC -0.074  0.009  1.000  0.076  0.372  0.050  0.042  0.062  0.151 
CINED -0.074 -0.126  0.076  1.000  0.224 -0.020 -0.244  0.237 -0.087 
FE -0.189 -0.155  0.372  0.224  1.000 -0.197 -0.046  0.100  0.181 
EE  0.034  0.021  0.050 -0.020 -0.197  1.000  0.044  0.127  0.203 
OWN -0.170  0.198  0.042 -0.244 -0.046  0.044  1.000 -0.091 -0.167 
FS -0.148 -0.478  0.062  0.237  0.100  0.127 -0.091  1.000  0.281 
LEV  0.112 -0.135  0.151 -0.087  0.181  0.203 -0.167  0.281  1.000 
ROA  1.000 -0.074 -0.074 -0.189  0.034 -0.170 -0.148  0.112 -0.407  
Notes:div=diversification strategy, CC=independent directors, CINED=independent board chair, 
FE=finance expertise, EE=executive experience, OWN=director ownership, FS=firm size, 
LEV=leverage. 
 
5.2. Multivariate regression analyses  
The result of Hausman’s test indicates that random effect method is the best 
specification method to use. The adjusted R
2
 obtained was 0.2846 indicating that 
the variables collectively explain 28% of the variation in the dependent variable. 
The f-statistics (f- 4.6476) was large and the corresponding p-value (p<0.001) was 
highly significant or lower than the alpha of 0.05. Therefore the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients of the explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero can be 
rejected confirming that the data fits the research model of the study. Hypothesis 
three predicted a significant relationship between directors’ expertise and 
diversification strategy. The result shows a significant negative relationship (p<0.1) 
between expertise of directors and diversification strategy.  
This implies a company with expertise directors on the board is unlikely to 
diversify its activities as a result of the complexity and extra risk associated with 
the diversification strategy. The result is also contrary to Hillman (2005) and 
Hillman et al., (2000) who argued that expert directors provide advice to firms on 
strategies and serve as a means of information to the board on how other firms 
operate and dealt with certain problems. In addition this could be because the 
directors will provide the firm with other opinions. In addition, the result implies 
that directors with expertise and experience in finance industry will likely ensure 
that the company adopts traditional strategy by discouraging the management from 
diversifying the company in order to reduce the risk associated with diversification 
(Stiroh & Rumble, 2006) and in order to reduce their monitoring over those new 
businesses the firm will diversify into.  
Companies could use directors with expertise to enhance their competitive 
advantage by providing expert advice to the company especially in relation to 
technical areas which requires expert knowledge to deal with. 
The result also indicates that firm size is negatively related with diversification 
strategy. This is contrary to Sufian (2010) who argued that large companies 
diversify their activities as a result of the availability of more resources to the big 
companies which will enable them to diversify into other businesses. The result 
also indicates that firm performance is negatively associated with diversification. 
This is contrary to Hillman (2005) who suggests that high performing firms tend to 
diversify their activities as a result of the available resources from their profit 
which they need to invest in new business in order to expand and become more 
profitable. The remaining hypotheses tested were not significant.   
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Table 3. Results of regression analysis  
  Pooled OLS  REM  FEM 
Constant  0.4256(2.4656)***  0.3449(1.7818)***  0.4495(1.7744)* 
CC  0.1442(0.4265)  0.5061(1.2283)  0.3443(0.5585) 
CINED  0.0973(0.8412)  0.2132(1.3627)  0.4446(1.6225) 
FE -0.4162(-1.5768) -0.5987(-1.7760)* -0.9161(-1.8951)* 
EE -0.0266(-0.1340) -0.2050(-0.7643) -0.7550(-1.8143)* 
DDO  0.9147(1.6205)  0.6811(0.9473) -0.5035(-0.4873) 
Firm size -62.8006(-5.9614)*** -65.70322(-6.3884)*** -62.2698(-5.3253)*** 
LEV  0.8966(0.9031)  1.7216(1.3918)  7.0140(2.8082)*** 
ROA -73.960(-1.2003) -86.4885(-1.6730)* -79.379(-1.4856) 
Year dummies  0.0654(0.5160)  0.0362(0.3541)  0.0055(0.0527) 
Year dummies  0.0922(0.7214)  0.0639(0.6137)  0.0341(0.3123) 
Year dummies  0.2316(1.8072)*  0.1932(1.8311)*  0.1835(1.6170) 
year dummies  0.9172(1.5037)  1.0191(1.9998)**  0.9496(1.8179)* 
R2  0.3637  0.3626  0.6898 
Adjusted R2  0.2858  0.2846  0.5510 
F-statistics  4.6695***  4.6476***  4.9712*** 
Durbin-Watson  0.8678  1.2807  1.7833 
Hausman’s Test  NA  9.2004  NA 
Notes: OLS= ordinary least squares, REM=random effect method, FEM=fixed effect method, 
CC=independent directors, CINED=independent board chair, FE=finance expertise, EE=executive 
experience, DDO=director ownership, LEV=leverage, ROA= return on assets. 
 
6. Further Analysis 
To assess the sensibility of the result to alternative form of analysis and in order 
to control for possible problem of endogeneity, we performed additional test using 
generalized method of moments (GMM). In addition to estimation based on least 
squares, the model was re-estimated based on the generalized method of moment 
model and the result as presented in Table four indicates some cases of sensitivities 
in the coefficient of some variables. The coefficient of board composition and 
ownership have become statistically significant but remained in the same direction 
while executive experience has become positive but remained in the same 
direction. 
Except for these cases of sensitivities, the direction and statistical significance 
of all the remaining variables remained unchanged both in direction and statistical 
significance confirming that the result presented earlier based on the OLS model is 
robust to any potential problem of endogeneity. The sensitivity noticed could be as 
a result of the fact that corporate governance mechanisms may take time before 
their effect is felt. Furthermore, the sensitivity could be explained by the reduction 
in the period of observation from five to four years and finally, omission error in 
the model could also account for the sensitivities reported. The result of j-statistics 
indicates that the instruments used are valid.  
 
Table 4.Estimation based on generalized method of moments model 
 Estimation based on OLS model Estimation based on GMM model 
Constant  0.3449(1.7818)***  0.2813(1.761)* 
CC  0.5061(1.2283)  0.2069(0.7315)*** 
CINED  0.2132(1.3627)  0.0466(0.5771) 
FE -0.5987(-1.7760)* -0.4229(-1.912)** 
EE -0.2050(-0.7643)  0.0717(0.449) 
OWN  0.6811(0.9473)  1.2040(2.322)** 
Firm size -65.70322(-6.3884)*** -50.23(-6.567)*** 
Leverage  1.7216(1.3918)  0.2977(0.4980) 
ROA -86.4885(-1.6730)*  0.2316(1.8072)* 
Year dummies -86.4885(-1.6730)*       - 
Year dummies  0.0362(0.3541)  0.1317(1.559) 
Year dummies  0.0639(0.6137)  0.1786(2.099)** 
year dummies  0.1932(1.8311)*  0.1468(1.722)* 
R2  1.0191(1.9998)**    - 
Adjusted R2  0.3626    - 
F-statistics  0.2846    - 
Durbin-Watson  4.6476***    - 
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Hausman’s Test  1.2807    - 
J-statistics  9.2004  0.3590(0.5490) 
Notes: CC=independent directors, CINED=independent board chair, FE=finance expertise, 
EE=executive experience, OWN=direct director ownership, OLS=ordinary least squares, GMM= 
generalized method of moments. 
 
7. Conclusion  
This study examined the attributes of board of directors and ownership structure 
variables that are associated with diversification strategy of finance companies. 
Major corporate failure and financial crisis have been associated with board 
monitoring ineffectiveness. Therefore, understanding board attributes that are 
suitable for a particular company and how those attributes influence diversification 
strategy is necessary. Prior studies focused on investigating the impact of 
diversification on the performance of companies in the West with few studies 
focusing on developing countries. This study enhances the current literature by 
examining the impact of board attributes and ownership structure on diversification 
strategy of finance companies in Malaysia. 
The result from the study suggests that expertise of directors is negatively 
related with diversification strategy. This indicates that firms with expert directors 
on the board are likely to remain focused in their traditional business. The result of 
estimation based on generalized method of moments suggests that the result is 
robust to possible endogeneity problem. The study has provided an insight into the 
board attributes which influence diversification strategy of a finance company and 
aid directors in structuring the board in line with their strategic focus. It provides 
policy makers with a better understanding of the various characteristics a board 
should have based on the strategic focus of the finance company and ultimately 
setting the appropriate level of regulatory requirements. 
The study is limited to finance companies listed on the main market of Bursa 
Malaysia and based on five year (2007-2011) observation period. Future studies 
could increase the sample size and look at other sectors of the economy and period 
of observation. Qualitative approach could also provide direct information from 
those involved in making strategic decisions in companies. The study is based on 
data from one country, although there are similarities in corporate governance 
mechanisms among countries, the results could be influenced by the context of the 
study. 
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